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Abstract
Credit networks represent a way of modeling trust between entities in a network. Nodes in the network print their own
currency and trust each other for a certain amount of each other’s currency. This allows the network to serve as a decentralized
payment infrastructure—arbitrary payments can be routed through the network by passing IOUs between trusting nodes in their
respective currencies—and obviates the need for a common currency. Nodes can repeatedly transact with each other and pay for
the transaction using trusted currency. A natural question to ask in this setting is: how long can the network sustain liquidity, i.e.,
how long can the network support the routing of payments before credit dries up? We answer this question in terms of the long
term failure probability of transactions for various network topologies and credit values.
We prove that the transaction failure probability is independent of the path along which transactions are routed. We show that
under symmetric transaction rates, the transaction failure probability in a number of well-known graph families goes to zero as
the size, density or credit capacity of the network increases. We also show via simulations that even networks of small size and
credit capacity can route transactions with high probability if they are well-connected. Further, we characterize a centralized
currency system as a special type of a star network (one where edges to the root have infinite credit capacity, and transactions
occur only between leaf nodes) and compute the steady-state transaction failure probability in a centralized system. We show that
liquidity in star networks, complete graphs and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks is comparable to that in equivalent centralized currency
systems; thus we do not lose much liquidity in return for their robustness and decentralized properties.
1 Introduction
One of the primary functions of money is as a medium of exchange. This function is facilitated by governments and central
banks that issue currency and declare it to be legal tender, i.e., the state promises to accept that currency back as payment for
goods and services. Thus currency represents an obligation issued by the state, and when used to make a payment, results in a
transfer of the state’s obligation from the payer to the payee. A decision to accept payment in a currency is therefore a decision
to trust the issuer of the currency to fulfill its obligations.
The modern banking system is a centralized currency infrastructure. The central bank sits at the root of the tree. It issues
currency, government notes, etc. Retail banks, individuals and businesses form the leaves of this tree. Since they cannot print
their own currency, they trust the central bank for an infinite amount of money (in theory, at least). Many non-governmental
organizations also issue their own currencies, known as scrip. Examples of such scrip systems in the online world include
Facebook credits, Yootles [RSK07], P2P systems where such currency is used to solve the free-rider problem [VCS03, AJ06],
and virtual worlds such as Everquest and Second Life that have their own currencies. A challenge with scrip systems is to
determine how much currency to issue in order to ensure liquidity without devaluing the currency [KFH07].
We study an alternate model of credit, credit networks, introduced independently by DeFigueiredo and Barr [DB05], by
Ghosh et al. [GMR+07], and by Karlan et. al. [KMRS09]. We generalize the model based on the insight that payments can be
made in any currency as long as it is trusted by the payee. So nodes in our model act as banks and print their own currency and
trust each other for certain amounts of each other’s currency. This allows them to transact with each other without the need for a
common currency: as long as there is a chain of sufficient credit from the payee to the payer, arbitrary payments can be made by
passing obligations between trusting agents in their respective currencies. We study the question of long-term liquidity (i.e.,
capacity to route payments) in credit networks when nodes repeatedly transact with each other.
Illustrative Example. Consider a credit network with three nodes u, v and w with edge (u, v) having credit limit c1 (i.e., u
trusts v for up to c1 units of v’s currency) and edge (v, w) having a credit limit c2. If w wants to purchase a product or service
from u worth p units of w’s currency, where p ≤ min{c1, c2}, the transaction proceeds by w issuing an IOU to v worth p units
of w’s currency and v issuing an IOU to u worth p units of v’s currency. However, if p > min{c1, c2} the transaction fails. As a
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result of a successful transaction, the edges (u, v) and (v, w) now have capacities c1 − p and c2 − p respectively (since v and w
have depleted part of their credit line). But this transaction also results in the creation of edges (v, u) and (w, v) each having
capacity p, since now v can trust u for up to p units of its own currency, and w can trust v for up to p units of its own currency.
Thus routing payments in credit networks is identical to routing residual flows in general flow networks.
u
v
w
c1 c2
(a) Before the transaction
u
v
w
c1 − p c2 − p
p p
(b) After the transaction
Figure 1: Illustrative Example
The papers that introduced this model used it as a generalization of budget constraints in auctions [GMR+07] and as a
mechanism for providing social collateral/insurance for transactions between untrusting agents in a network [DB05, KMRS09].
In addition to these papers, Resnick and Sami [RS09] study how to update credit values along edges over time while ensuring
robustness to Sybil attacks. They show that there is a social cost to allowing transactions via intermediaries—any protocol for
updating credit values that is Sybil-proof in a certain sense can lead to a reduction in overall credit balances in expectation.
Previous work on this model used the term “trust network” for it; we prefer the term “credit network” to distinguish this
model from all the previous ones that also model trust/reputation in networks in settings unrelated to ours such as web search
[PBMW99, GGMP04] and studying people’s opinions of each other [GKRT04, LHK10].
Credit networks have a number of interesting and useful properties. First, the loss incurred by nodes in the network is
bounded. Consider a scenario where a potential attacker, say node x, injects nodes into this network. The attacker’s nodes can
extend each other credit lines worth arbitrary amount of money, but in order to transact with one of the honest players the attacker
x must dupe one of them, say u, into extending him a line of credit. If u extends x a credit line for c units, x can transact with
honest nodes in the network for up to c units by giving u IOUs worth c units in its currency. Once the transaction is complete, x
can then disappear leaving u with unredeemable IOUs worth c units, and u incurs a loss equal to c units in x’s currency. This
demonstrates that the total loss incurred by the nodes in the network is bounded by the total credit extended by honest nodes to
the attacker’s nodes. In particular, the loss incurred by the nodes in the network does not depend on the number of nodes the
attacker injects. Second, since a node in the network only accepts IOUs from other nodes to whom it has extended a line of
credit, the loss incurred by honest players in the network is localized. In other words, the only nodes that incur a loss are the ones
that extended credit to the attacker nodes. In this sense, the system is fair; it protects a node from losses resulting from another
node’s lack of judgement. Finally, routing payments in credit networks is efficient since it only requires a max-flow computation
[DB05, GMR+07].
These properties make this model useful not only for monetary transactions, but also in any setting where there is a need
to model trust between nodes in a network. It is particularly well-suited for transactions in exchange economies such as P2P
networks where it can be used to improve inefficiencies resulting from asynchronous demand and bilateral trading [LHL+10]. It
has been used as part of a system called Ostra [MPGD08] designed to thwart spam in email. Ostra is similar in spirit to Gmail’s
Priority Inbox. This model can also be used in settings such as combating spam in viral marketing over social networks and
packet routing in mobile ad-hoc networks. There is a large body of work in economics and sociology on social capital and favor
exchanges in networks [JRBT11]. This model provides a rigorous way of not only keeping track of favors owed to and by each
individual in a network, but also a way to exchange favors, via trusted intermediaries, between individuals that do not know each
other directly.
However, in order for the model to be of practical use it should be able to support repeated transactions between nodes over
a long period of time. This motivates the following question, which we formulate and study in this paper: if the network is
sufficiently well-connected and has sufficient credit to begin with, can we sustain transactions in perpetuity without additional
injection of credit? How does liquidity depend upon network topology and transaction rates between nodes, and how does it
compare with the centralized model described above?
We show positive results for all of the above questions. We show that the failure probability of transactions is independent of
the path used to route flow between nodes. For symmetric transaction rates, we show analytically and via simulations that the
failure probability for complete graphs, Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs, and preferential attachment graphs goes to zero as the size, the
density or the credit capacity of the network increases. Further, we characterize a centralized currency system as a special type
of a star network (one where edges to the root have infinite credit capacity, and transactions occur only between leaf nodes)
and compute its steady-state failure probability. We show how to construct a centralized system that is equivalent to a given
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credit network and that the steady-state failure probability in star networks and complete graphs is within a constant-factor of
that in equivalent centralized currency systems. We show that the node bankruptcy probability in credit networks is Θ(1/hG)
whereas that in an equivalent centralized system is Θ(1/c¯G), where hG is the harmonic mean of the total credit capacities on
edges incident upon nodes in G and c¯G is the corresponding arithmetic mean. These results are similar in spirit to price of
anarchy bounds—in return for all the benefits resulting from the decentralized nature of the system, we do not lose much liquidity
compared to a centralized model with a common currency.
We would like to qualify our results by stating that nodes in our model are not endowed with any rationality. We treat credit
values on edges and transaction rates between nodes as being exogenously defined. We also ignore currency exchange ratios, i.e.,
we assume them to be unity for clarity of exposition; this does not qualitatively affect our results. These questions represent
promising directions for further study of this model and we discuss them at the end of the paper along with other open problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines our model and describes our main results, Section 3 contains
steady-state analysis of the transaction success probability in our model and its comparison with a centralized model of credit,
Section 4 discusses results of simulating repeated transactions on two random graph families, Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs and power-law
graphs constructed using the Baraba´si-Albert preferential attachment model [BA99], and finally Section 5 has some concluding
remarks along with a discussion of a number of interesting directions for further study of this model.
2 Our Model & Results
A credit network G = (V,E) is a directed graph with n nodes and m edges. Nodes represent entities or agents. Edges represent
pairwise credit limits between agents. An edge (u, v) ∈ E has capacity cuv > 0, which implies that u has extended a credit line
of cuv units to v in v’s currency. If a node s needs to pay p units in her currency to node t (for example, to buy a good that t is
selling), the payment can go through if the maximum credit flow from t to s is at least p units. The payment will get routed
through a chain of trusted nodes from s to t. Note that payment flows in the opposite direction of credit, so a payment merely
results in a redistribution of credit; the total credit in the network remains unchanged.
We study liquidity under the following simple model of repeated transactions: we assume that each edge (u, v) in G has
total credit capacity cuv + cvu = c where cuv, cvu are integers. The transaction rate between nodes is given by the n× n matrix
Λ = {λuv : u, v ∈ V ;λuu = 0} such that
∑
u,v λuv = 1. At each time step, we pick a pair of nodes (s, t) with probability λst
and try to route a unit payment along the shortest feasible path from s to t. If such a path exists, we route the flow along that path
and modify edge capacities along the path as described previously (i.e., for each edge (u, v) on the path, increment cuv by 1 and
decrement cvu by 1). The transaction fails if there is no path between s and t.
We begin by noting that at any time step an edge between nodes u and v can be in one of (c+ 1) states, having capacity c
from u to v and 0 from v to u, having capacity c− 1 from u to v and 1 from v to u and so on down to having 0 capacity from
u to v and c from v to u. Each successful transaction results in a change of state for all edges along the shortest path from
the source to the destination. Therefore, these repeated transactions between nodes in G induce the following Markov chain
M(G,Λ): each state of the Markov chain encapsulates the state of all the edges in the network. Since there are m edges, each
of which can be in one of (c+ 1) states, the Markov chain has (c+ 1)m states. A successful transaction results in a transition
between two states. Let P be the transition matrix. The transition probability, P (S1,S2) from state S1 to S2 is equal to λst
where routing a unit payment from s to t in state S1 along the shortest feasible path results in the network being in state S2. The
probability P (S,S) is the probability that the transaction is infeasible when the network is in state S . This is equal to the sum of
all probabilities λst such that the network in state S has no path from s to t.
A note on terminology: we will sometimes refer to an edge (u, v) as being “bidirectional” if both cuv and cvu are non-zero,
and as “unidirectional” if exactly one of cuv and cvu is zero.
We describe our main results below. Our first result obviates the need to route payments along the shortest feasible path.
Theorem. Let (s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sT , tT ) be the set of transactions of value v1, v2, . . . , vT respectively that succeed when
the payment from si to ti is routed along a path Pi. Then the same set of transactions succeed when the payment from si to ti is
routed along any other feasible path P ′i .
In order to prove this, we observe that routing flow along a directed cycle changes the state of the network but does not affect
the total credit available to any node. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 1. Given a credit network G, let S and S ′ be two states of G. We say that S ′ is cycle-reachable from S if the network
can be transformed from state S to state S ′ by routing a sequence of payments along feasible cycles (i.e., from a node to itself
along a feasible path).
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Network Topology Transaction Regime Credit Network Centralized System
Star uniform Θ(1/c) Θ(1/c)
Line uniform 1 - Θ(c/n2) Θ(1/c)
Cycle uniform 1 - Θ(c/n) Θ(1/c)
Complete symmetric Θ(1/nc) Θ(1/nc)
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi2: Gc(n, p) symmetric Θ(1/npc) Θ(1/npc)
Baraba´si-Albert3: GBAc (n, d) symmetric Θ(1/dc) Θ(1/dc)
Table 1: Failure probability comparison between credit networks and equivalent centralized currency systems
Cycle-reachability defines a partition C over the set of possible states of the network; each equivalence class in C is the set
of states that are cycle-reachable from each other. We show the following result about the steady-state distribution ofM over
equivalence classes in C:
Theorem. Consider a Markov chainMS0(G,Λ) starting in state S0 induced by a symmetric transaction rate matrix Λ over
nodes in G. Let CS0 ⊆ C be the set of equivalence classes accessible from S0 under the regime defined by Λ. ThenMS0 has a
uniform steady-state distribution over CS0 .
We use this result to bound the steady-state node bankruptcy probability in general graphs and transaction failure probability
for trees, cycles and complete graphs. A node being bankrupt is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a transaction with
that node as the payer to fail; the necessary and sufficient condition for a transaction to fail is that the network has a directed
cut of zero capacity between the payer and the payee. Let dv be the total credit capacity of all edges incident upon node v in a
graph G. Let hG be the harmonic mean of the dvs and d¯G be the arithmetic mean. We show that ifM(G,Λ) is ergodic and
Λ is symmetric, the average steady-state bankruptcy probability of a node in a credit network is Θ(1/hG) whereas that in an
equivalent centralized system is Θ(1/d¯G). We show that if Λ is uniform, the steady-state transaction failure probability in star
networks is Θ(1/c), the steady-state success probability for line graphs is Θ(c/n2) and that for cycles is Θ(c/n). We also show
that if Λ is symmetric, the steady-state transaction failure probability for complete graphs is Θ(1/nc). Our results imply that for
“thin” graphs such as lines and cycles, the steady-state failure probability goes to one with the size of the network, whereas for
well-connected graphs such as star networks, complete graphs and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks1, the steady-state failure probability
goes to zero with the size, the average node degree or the credit capacity in the network.
Further, we characterize a centralized currency system as a special type of a tree network (one where edges to the root have
infinite credit capacity, and transactions occur only between leaf nodes) and compute its steady-state failure probability. We show
how to construct a centralized system that is equivalent to a given credit network and that the steady-state failure probability in
star networks and complete graphs is within a constant-factor of that in equivalent centralized currency systems.
Table 1 shows our main analytical results on liquidity for a number of network topologies and their comparison with
equivalent centralized currency systems.
In addition to these analytical results, we simulated repeated transactions on two random graph families: Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs
and power-law graphs generated using the Baraba´si-Albert preferential attachment (BA) model [BA99]. The simulations showed
that relatively small values of density and credit capacity were sufficient to attain a transaction success probability in excess of
0.9. We also demonstrate that for both topologies, if we hold the average node degree and credit capacity on edges constant, the
size of the network (i.e., number of nodes) had no effect on the steady-state success probability.
3 Analysis
We first analyze the combinatorial structure induced by this model of making payments through passing IOUs. An understanding
of this combinatorial structure allows us to characterize the steady-state behavior of the Markov chain induced by repeated
transactions for a number of network topologies. Finally, we compare the steady-state success probability in credit networks
with various topologies to that in an equivalent centralized currency infrastructure.
1For a connected Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network, Gc(n, p), the node bankruptcy probability is Θ(1/(npc)).
2We conjecture based on simulations and heuristic calculations that the transaction failure probability is Θ(1/(npc)).
3We conjecture based on simulations that the failure probability is Θ(1/(dc)).
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3.1 Combinatorial Structure
A state of the network can be associated with a generalized score vector, which characterizes the credit available to each node in
that state.
Definition 2. Given a labeled, directed graph D over n nodes with edges having associated capacities, a vector V =
〈v1, . . . , vn〉 ∈ Rn+ is the generalized score vector of D if the total capacity on outgoing edges from i in D is vi for i = 1, . . . , n.
This is a generalization of the score vector defined by the outdegree of nodes in an orientation of a labeled multigraph
[KW81]. Note that two cycle-reachable states have the same generalized score vector, and in fact, generalized score vectors
characterize classes of cycle-reachable states:
Lemma 1 (Generalization of Proposition 4.10 in [Gio07]). Given a credit network G, two states S and S ′ of G are cycle-
reachable if and only if they have the same generalized score vector.
Moreover, two cycle-reachable states have exactly the same set of feasible transactions:
Lemma 2. For any equivalence class C ∈ C of a given network, if a transaction (s, t, v) (i.e., routing a payment of v units from
node s to node t) is feasible in some state S ∈ C, it is feasible in all states S′ ∈ C.
Using the definition of cycle-reachability and the above observations, we show the following:
Theorem 3. Let (s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sT , tT ) be the set of transactions of value v1, v2, . . . , vT respectively that succeed when
the payment from si to ti is routed along a path Pi. Then the same set of transactions succeed when the payment from si to ti is
routed along any other feasible path P ′i .
Proof. Note that a failed transaction does not change the state of the network, so without loss of generality, we assume that the
set of successful transactions (si, ti) occurred in successive timesteps i = 1 to T . We prove the result by induction on T . The
statement clearly holds for T = 1.
Assume that the statement holds for T = k. Let the initial state of the network be S0. Let Sk be the state of the network
when, starting from S0, transactions (si, ti) for i = 1, . . . , k were routed along path Pi. Let S ′k be the corresponding state of the
network after, again starting from S0, the same set of transactions were routed along paths P ′i, i = 1, . . . , k. We will show that
Sk is cycle-reachable from S ′k.
A successful transaction (s, t) only changes the credit extended to s and t; the credit extended to any of the intermediate
nodes remains unchanged. Since Sk and S ′k are the resulting states of the network after the same sequence of payments were
successfully routed starting at the same state, the credit distribution (or equivalently, the generalized score vectors) in Sk and S ′k
must be identical. Therefore, Sk and S ′k are cycle-reachable. Thus, from Lemma 2 if the transaction (sk+1, tk+1) is feasible in
Sk then it is also feasible in S ′k. This proves the result.
This result shows that routing in credit networks has a path-independence property: the choice of paths along which a
sequence of payments are routed does not affect their feasibility. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 immediately implies the following
corollary:
Corollary 4. If a transaction (s, t, v) in some state in equivalence class Ci results in a transition to a state in equivalence class
Cj , then the reverse transaction (t, s, v) from any state in Cj will result in a transition to a state in Ci.
Note that the above observations do not require the edge capacities or payment flows to be integral. However, when restricted
to a setting where edge capacities are integers and we route unit flows between nodes, the states of the credit network become
equivalent to orientations of a labeled multigraph (since an edge of capacity c can be viewed as c labeled edges of unit capacity
each). It is known that there is a bijection between score vectors of a labeled multigraph and forests of a labeled multigraph
[KW81]. In the rest of the paper, we assume that edge capacities are integers and we route unit flows between nodes. This allows
us to use the equivalence between forests, score vectors and cycle-reachable equivalence classes to characterize the steady-state
of the Markov chain induced by repeated transactions.
3.2 Steady-state Analysis
Using observations about the combinatorial structure of the model, we next prove that the Markov chain induced by a symmetric
transaction rate matrix Λ has a uniform steady-state distribution over C.
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Theorem 5. Consider a Markov chainMS0(G,Λ) starting in state S0 induced by a symmetric transaction rate matrix Λ over
nodes in G. Let CS0 ⊆ C be the set of equivalence classes accessible from S0 under the regime defined by Λ. ThenMS0 has a
uniform steady-state distribution over CS0 .
Proof. As a consequence of the above facts, we can represent transactions as resulting in transitions between equivalence classes
in C instead of transitions between states ofM(G,Λ). Let Tij be the set of transactions (s, t) that result in a transition from
some state in Ci to some state in Cj . Then, (overloading the symbol P ) we define the transition matrix over equivalence classes
in CS0 as
P (Ci, Cj) =
∑
(s,t)∈Tij
λst
Note that Corollary 4 implies that (s, t) ∈ Tij if and only if (t, s) ∈ Tji. Further since Λ is symmetric, for any equivalence
classes Ci, Cj ∈ CS0 , P (Ci, Cj) = P (Cj , Ci). Since P is a symmetric stochastic matrix, the uniform distribution is stationary
with respect to P .
This immediately gives the following corollary:
Corollary 6. IfM(G,Λ) is an ergodic Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction rate matrix Λ, it has a uniform steady
state distribution over C.
Next we show a sufficient condition forM to be ergodic.
Lemma 7. If for all u 6= v, λuv > 0, thenM is ergodic.
Proof. M has a finite number of states. Since ∀u, v, u 6= v, λuv > 0, for all states S ofM, P (S,S) < 1. Therefore,M does
not have a sink state. It is irreducible since for any states S and S ′ such that the “edit distance” between S and S ′ is k, the k-step
transition probability from S to S ′, P k(S,S ′) > 0. Finally, to see thatM is aperiodic, consider a state S such that P (S,S) > 0.
For this state, both P 2(S,S) and P 3(S,S) are non-zero. Therefore, state i is aperiodic. SinceM is finite-state, irreducible and
aperiodic, it is ergodic.
Theorem 5 and Corollary 6 reduce the problem of computing the steady-state transaction failure probability to a counting
problem. We instantiate this theorem for various network topologies to characterize their steady-state distribution and infer from
it the steady-state failure probability in those topologies. For general graphs, we can use this theorem to bound the bankruptcy
probability of a node.
Theorem 8. LetM(G,Λ) be an ergodic Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction matrix Λ over nodes in G. Fix a
vertex v. The steady-state probability that v goes bankrupt is at most 1/(dv + 1), where dv =
∑
(v,u)∈E(cuv + cvu) is total
credit capacity of all edges incident upon node v.
Proof. From Corollary 6, we know thatM(G,Λ) has a uniform steady-state distribution over the cycle-reachable equivalence
classes of G. So the steady-state probability that v goes bankrupt is simply the fraction of equivalence classes in which v is
bankrupt.
We know that the total number of cycle-reachable equivalence classes of G is the number of subforests over all n nodes,
whereas the number of equivalence classes in which v is bankrupt is equal to the number of subforests on the remaining n− 1
nodes [KW81]. Let F (G) be the total number of subforests of G and F (G−v) be the number of subforests on nodes other
than v. An edge e = (u, v) having total credit capacity ce can be viewed as ce labeled edges each of unit capacity. So, each
subforest on the remaining n− 1 nodes can be extended to a subforest on all n nodes by adding one of the dv edges incident on
v or adding v without adding any edges. Therefore F (G) ≥ (dv + 1)F (G−v). Thus, the steady-state probability that v goes
bankrupt, F (G−v)/F (G), is at most 1/(dv + 1).
Therefore, if hG is the harmonic mean of the dvs in G, then the average node bankruptcy probability in G is Θ(1/hG).
3.2.1 Trees
The above results allow us to make the following observations about the steady-state distribution over trees. We denote by Tn;c a
tree with n nodes whose each edge has total credit capacity c.
Theorem 9. IfM(Tn;c,Λ) is an ergodic Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction rate matrix Λ on a tree Tn;c, then
M(Tn;c,Λ) has a uniform steady-state distribution over its states.
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Proof. The result follows directly from Corollary 6 and the fact that, since trees have no cycles, each equivalence class in C is a
singleton.
SinceM(Tn;c,Λ) has a uniform steady-state distribution over its states, the steady-state probability that a transaction over
a path of length l will succeed is [c/(c + 1)]l; this follows from the fact that each edge along the path should have non-zero
capacity in the direction of the transaction. Therefore, the steady-state success probability, Ps, for Tn;c is given by
Ps(Tn;c) = El
(
c
c+ 1
)l
Using this expression for the steady-state success probability, we can show that if Λ is uniform (i.e., λst = 1/n(n− 1) for all
s, t), the steady-state success probability for tree networks has a lower bound of Θ(c/n2) and an upper bound of Θ(c/(c+ 1)).
The lower bound is attained for line networks and the upper bound for star networks.
3.2.2 Cycles
Next we derive the steady-state success probability for cycle graphs. Let G◦n;c be a cycle graph of n > 2 nodes where each edge
has a total credit capacity of c. LetM(G◦n;c,Λ) be an ergodic Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction matrix Λ. Then
M(G◦n;c,Λ) will have a uniform steady-state distribution over the cycle-reachable equivalence classes of G◦n;c. We use this fact
to show the following result:
Theorem 10. IfM(G◦n;c,Λ) is an ergodic Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction matrix Λ over nodes in G◦n;c, then
the steady-state transaction success probability, Ps(G◦n;c), is given by
Ps(G◦n;c) = El
rl + rn−l − 2rn
1− rn
where r = c/(c+ 1) and l is the number of edges between a pair of transacting nodes.
The proof involves counting the total number of equivalence classes of G◦n;c and the number of classes which allow a
transaction between a pair of nodes that have l edges between them. See Appendix A for the proof.
3.2.3 Complete Graphs
Let Kn;c be a complete graph over n nodes such that each edge has total capacity c. From Theorem 8, we know that the
bankruptcy probability of a node in Kn;c is Θ(1/nc). Next we will show that the steady-state transaction failure probability
between two nodes in Kn;c is also Θ(1/nc). Note that a node being bankrupt is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a
transaction with that node as the payer to fail.
Theorem 11. LetM(Kn;c,Λ) be an ergodic Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction matrix Λ over nodes in Kn;c.
Then the steady-state transaction failure probability in Kn;c is Θ(1/nc).
See Appendix B for the proof. We will compare this probability with that in an equivalent centralized model to show that
liquidity in credit networks with this topology is comparable to the centralized system.
3.2.4 Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Networks
Here we prove that under a symmetric transaction regime, the steady-state probability that a node in a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network,
Gc(n, p), will go bankrupt is Θ(1/(npc)). Note that Gc(n, p) is a random graph over n nodes where every edge is present with
probability p and has capacity c if present.
Theorem 12. Consider a Gc(n, p) graph where p > 8(ln cn)/n (just slightly more than the connectivity threshold of 2 lnn/n).
LetM(Gc(n, p),Λ) be an ergodic Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction matrix Λ over nodes in Gc(n, p). Fix a
vertex v. The steady-state probability that v goes bankrupt is Θ(1/(npc)).
7
Proof. From Theorem 8, we know that the bankruptcy probability of v is at most 1/(dv +1). We need to show that in expectation
this term is Θ(1/(npc)). By Chernoff bounds, P[dv ≤ npc/2] ≤ e−np/8 ≤ e− ln cn = 1/(cn), which bounds EG[1/(dv + 1)]
as follows:
EG[1/(dv + 1)] ≤ P[dv < npc/2] · 1 + P[dv ≥ npc/2] 1
npc/2
≤ 1
cn
+
2
npc
= Θ
(
1
npc
)
We conjecture that the steady-state failure probability of transactions between nodes in a Gc(n, p) network under a symmetric
transaction regime is also Θ(1/(npc)). This is based on heuristic calculations using the generating functions for complete graphs
with pc instead of c, as well as on simulation results (see Section 4.2).
Conjecture 1. Let Gc(n, p) be a connected credit network (i.e., p > lnn/n) and letM(Gc(n, p),Λ) be an ergodic Markov
chain induced by a symmetric transaction matrix Λ over nodes in Gc(n, p). Then, the steady-state transaction failure probability
in Gc(n, p) is Θ(1/npc).
As with complete graphs, we will also compute this probability in an equivalent centralized model and argue that this
conjecture, if true, would imply that the failure probability inGc(n, p) credit networks is within a constant factor of the equivalent
centralized model.
3.2.5 Baraba´si-Albert Preferential Attachment Networks
We state a conjecture regarding the steady-state transaction failure probability in power-law graphs constructed using the
Baraba´si-Albert preferential attachment model. The Baraba´si-Albert model is a evolving random graph model where each
arriving node creates edges to existing nodes with probability proportional to their degrees. It is parameterized by the number of
nodes in the network, n, and the number of edges d that each new node creates.
Conjecture 2. Let GBAc (n, d) be a random graph over n nodes created using the Baraba´si-Albert preferential attachment
model where each arriving node creates d edges and each edge has total credit capacity c. LetM(GBAc (n, d),Λ) be an ergodic
Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction matrix Λ over nodes in GBAc (n, d). Then, the steady-state transaction failure
probability in GBAc (n, d) is Θ(1/dc).
Note that we conjecture the transaction failure probability to be independent of network size n. This conjecture is supported
by simulation results (see Section 4).
3.3 Centralized Currency Infrastructure
Since we introduced credit networks as an alternative to a centralized currency infrastructure, a natural question arises: how does
the steady-state failure probability in a credit network compare with that in a centralized infrastructure? Next we address this
question.
As described previously, a centralized currency infrastructure can be modeled as a tree with a bank at its root and individuals
as leaves. However, this setup is different from a star network in that the root does not participate in any transactions; all
transactions occur between leaf nodes, i.e., along paths of length two. Let the centralized infrastructure be represented by a
network G∗ with a root node r representing the bank, and n leaf nodes representing individuals. Let cru < ∞ be the credit
extended by bank r to node u. Note that since the bank issues a common currency a leaf node trusts the bank for an infinite
sum of money, i.e., cur = ∞. A successful transaction of unit value leads to an increase by one of the payee’s credit and a
decrease by one of the payer’s credit; the total credit extended to leaf nodes in the system stays constant. We can prove that if the
total credit extended to leaf nodes is C, then the steady-state transaction failure probability in a centralized currency system is
(n− 1)/(C + n− 1).
Theorem 13. LetM(G∗,Λ) be an ergodic Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction matrix Λ over a centralized
payment network G∗ with n leaf nodes. Let C be the total credit extended to the leaf nodes. Then the steady-state transaction
failure probability inM is (n− 1)/(C + n− 1).
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Proof. Since the number of leaf nodes is n and the total credit extended to leaf nodes is C, the Markov chain has
(
C+n−1
n−1
)
states: this is the number of ways of distributing C objects among n people. In the centralized system, unlike credit networks,
a transaction fails if and only if the payer in the transaction, say node u, is bankrupt, i.e., cru = 0. Therefore, the transaction
failure probability is equal to the probability that a node is bankrupt. The number of states in which a given node is bankrupt
is given by
(
C+n−2
n−2
)
: this is the number of ways of distributing the total credit among the remaining n− 1 leaf nodes. From
Corollary 6, we know thatM has a uniform steady-state distribution over its states. Therefore, the steady-state probability that a
node is bankrupt is given by (
C+n−2
n−2
)(
C+n−1
n−1
) = n− 1
C + n− 1
So if c¯ = C/n is the average credit extended to a node in G∗, then the node bankruptcy probability of a node (as well as
the transaction failure probability) is Θ(1/c¯). Note that since the Markov chain has a uniform distribution over states of the
network, the steady-state transaction failure probability is independent of the initial state (i.e., the initial credit of each node in
the network).
3.3.1 Equivalence between Credit Networks and Centralized Currency Infrastructure
In order to be able to compare liquidity in the two models, we need to define the notion of equivalence between the two models.
Given a credit network G = (V,E) with n nodes, we construct an equivalent centralized currency infrastructure G(G) as follows:
G has nodes V ∪ {r} (where r is the root node) and a bidirectional edge between each node u and the root r. For each node u in
G, the total credit extended to it by the bank in the centralized model, cru, is given by cru =
∑
v∈V cvu where cvu is the initial
credit extended by v to u before the nodes start transacting. And finally, for all nodes u, we set cur =∞. This ensures that each
node has access to the same amount of credit in both models.
3.3.2 Liquidity Comparison
The procedure to convert a credit network in to an equivalent centralized currency system allows us to compare liquidity in credit
networks with that in an equivalent currency system. For the credit network topologies that we analyzed in Section 3.2, we state
the steady-state failure probability for their equivalent centralized systems under a symmetric, ergodic transaction regime by
invoking Theorem 13.
Cycle Graph For a cycle graph with n nodes where each edge has capacity c, the total capacity is nc. So, the steady-state
failure probability in the equivalent centralized system is (n − 1)/(nc + n − 1) = Θ(1/c). On the other hand, in a uniform
transaction regime, credit networks on cycle graphs have a steady-state failure probability of 1 − Θ(c/n) (see Appendix A).
However, for graphs with high expansion, the failure probability in credit networks is within a constant factor of that in equivalent
centralized systems (see below).
Complete Graph For a complete graph on n nodes where the total credit capacity between any pair of nodes is c, the total
credit capacity in the system is Nc, where N =
(
n
2
)
. So, the steady-state failure probability in the equivalent centralized system
is (n− 1)/(Nc+ n− 1) = Θ(1/nc), the same as that in the original credit network (Theorem 11).
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Graph For an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network, Gc(n, p), the expected total credit capacity in the network is Npc, where
N =
(
n
2
)
. Therefore, the steady-state failure probability in the equivalent centralized system is (n − 1)/(Npc + n − 1) =
Θ(1/npc). Thus, if Conjecture 1 is true, the failure probability in Gc(n, p) credit networks would be within a constant factor of
that in the equivalent centralized system.
Baraba´si-Albert Graph For a Baraba´si-Albert preferential attachment network, GBAc (n, d), the total credit capacity in the
network is ndc (i.e., nd edges each having total credit c). Therefore, the steady-state failure probability in the equivalent
centralized system is (n − 1)/(ndc + n − 1) = Θ(1/dc). Like Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks, if the conjecture about steady-state
failure probability for GBAc (n, d) credit networks (Conjecture 2) is true, then, credit networks with this topology too will have a
steady-state failure probability within a constant factor of that in an equivalent centralized system.
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4 Simulations
Next we present the results of simulating repeated transactions on credit networks from two well-studied families of random
graphs: Gc(n, p) (this is a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph with edge orientation chosen randomly and each edge assigned capacity c)
and power-law graphs generated using the Baraba´si-Albert preferential attachment (BA) model [BA99]. The Baraba´si-Albert
model is a evolving random graph model where each new node creates d edges to existing nodes with probability proportional to
their degrees. After constructing the graph, we assigned edge orientations randomly and set the capacity of each edge to c. The
goal of the simulations was to understand how the steady-state success probability in these networks depends on key network
parameters and to determine what values of network parameters yield a “high enough” success probability. In this sense, the
qualitative results obtained from running simulations complement the asymptotic analysis described in the previous section. For
Gc(n, p) the parameters of interest are n, p and c. However, since varying either n or p changes the density of the graph (i.e.,
average node degree), we also ran simulations where we changed both n and p such that np was held constant. For BA graphs,
the parameters of interest are the number of nodes (n), the number of edges each node creates (d), and credit capacity (c) of each
edge.
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  Figure 2: Effect of varying graph density ( verage node degree) on the steady-state success probability inGc(n, p) andGBAc (n, d)
graphs with n = 200 and c = 1.
A simulation run consi ted of constructing a network with a given set of parameters and doing repeated transactions on
it. At each time step, we chose a node pair (s, t) with uniform probability and tried to route a unit payment from s to t via
the shortest feasible path. If there was a path from s to t, we routed the p yment and modified edge capacities along the
path. Otherwise, we counted the transaction as a failure. We r peated this until the succ ss-rate (i.e fraction of transactions
that succeed) in two consecutive time windows was within ε of each other. We used a window size of 1000 time steps and
ε = 0.002. When the process converged, we measured the success rate at convergence, i.e., the total number of successful
transactions divided by the total number of time steps. We called this the steady-state success probability for that set of network
parameters. For each combination of network parameter values, we ran simulations on 100 graphs constructed from the same
distribution and computed the average and the standard deviation in success-rate over the 100 runs. In order to understand how
the success probability depends upon various network parameters, we repeated the set of 100 runs for different values of one of
the parameters, keeping the rest constant.
4.1 Effect of Variation in Network Density
In order to study the effect of density, we fixed n = 200 and c = 1 for both graph families. For Gc(n, p) we varied p from 0.18
to 0.45 and for BA graphs we varied d from 18 to 45. The average node degree of PA graphs is equal to 2d whereas for Gc(n, p)
the expected node degree is given by (n− 1)p. We picked d corresponding to each p such that 2d ≈ (n− 1)p so that we can
compare the plots for the two graph families.
Figure 2 shows the success probability as a function of average node degree for Gc(n, p) and BA graphs when np is
sufficiently larger than lnn so that the Gc(n, p) graph is connected. The success rate for both graph families is concave,
non-decreasing in p. Note that for networks of 200 nodes with edge capacity of 1 and an average node degree as low as 25,
the success probability for both topologies is in excess of 0.9. Moreover, the success probability quickly reaches a point of
diminishing returns where making the network denser does not help significantly. This is useful since it means that, in practice,
the network does not need to be very dense in order to route payments with a sufficiently high probability.
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Figure 3: Effect of varying credit capacity on the steady-state success probability in Gc(n, p) and GBAc (n, d) graphs with n =
100 and avg. node degree = 10.
4.2 Effect of Variation in Credit Capacity
In order to study the effect of varying credit capacity in the network, we fixed n = 100 for both graphs. We set p = 0.10 for
Gc(n, p) and d = 5 for BA graphs, thereby ensuring that their densities were equal. This choice of p and d also ensured that all
the graphs we constructed were connected. We varied c from 1 to 10. Figure 3 shows the mean and standard deviation in the
steady-state success-rate for both graph families as we vary c. In addition to the two plots, we also plot 1− (2/npc) as a function
of c. That plot tracks those for Gc(n, p) as well as for BA fairly closely and is further evidence in support of our conjecture
that the steady-state failure probability in Gc(n, p) graphs is Θ(1/npc) and in GBAc (n, d) is Θ(1/dc) and consequently, credit
networks with these topologies are within a constant-factor of the equivalent centralized currency system in terms of liquidity.
4.3 Effect of Variation in Network Size
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Figure 4: Effect of varying network size (number of nodes) on the steady-state success probability in Gc(n, p) and GBAc (n, d)
graphs with c = 1 and avg. node degree = 10.
In order to study the effect of varying network size for PA graphs, we fixed d = 5 and c = 1 and varied n from 20 to 500.
However, the same approach does not work for Gc(n, p) graphs since if we fix p and c and varied n, it would also vary the
average node degree. So, we ran two sets of simulations for Gc(n, p) graphs: one where we varied n keeping p = 0.10 and
c = 1 and the other where we fixed c = 1 and varied both n and p such that np was kept constant at 10.
Figure 4 shows the effect of varying network size on the success probability of both graph families. The noteworthy
observation is that if the density of the network is kept constant, then network size has no effect on the success rate for either
graph family; the success rate remains nearly constant at about 0.75 for BA graphs and about 0.78 for Gc(n, p) graphs. The
same pattern is also observed if np is held constant at 20 instead of 10 (so it is not an artifact of that specific value of np). This
is another observation in support of our conjecture about the steady-state failure probability in Gc(n, p) and BA graphs. If,
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however, np is not held constant, then success probability is again a concave non-decreasing function of n (much the same way
as it is of p).
5 Conclusion & Open Problems
In this paper we generalized the credit network model by allowing every node to print its own currency, and formulated and
studied the question of long-term liquidity in this network under a simple model of repeated transactions. Using the notion of
cycle-reachability, we showed that routing payments in credit networks has a path-independence property. We also showed that
the Markov chain induced by a symmetric transaction regime has a uniform steady-state distribution over the cycle-reachable
equivalence classes. We used this fact to derive the node bankruptcy probability in general graphs and the transaction failure
probability in a number of network topologies. We showed that, except in cycles, these probabilities are within a constant factor
of the corresponding values for an equivalent centralized payment infrastructure. Our analysis and simulations show that for a
number of well-known graph families, the steady-state failure probability under reasonable transaction regimes is comparable to
that in equivalent centralized currency systems. Thus, in return for the robustness and decentralized properties, this model does
not lose much liquidity compared to a centralized model.
5.1 Open Problems related to Liquidity
Our results on liquidity can be extended in a number of ways. One question that arises from our analysis is whether credit
network topologies with a high expansion have comparable liquidity with equivalent centralized systems. In general, can the
steady state success probability in general networks be expressed in terms of some key network properties such as density or
expansion? Another direction is to understand how success-rate and rate of convergence vary under various transaction regimes.
A natural regime to study would be where the probability that a node is a payer (payee) is proportional to the node’s in-degree
(out-degree). We also leave unanswered the question of mixing times of the Markov chain: our simulations on Gc(n, p) and BA
graphs converged relatively quickly but we do not have analytical results on the mixing time of the Markov chain and how it
depends on credit capacity and network topology. One can also ask how fault-tolerant credit networks are under various models
of node failures. For example, if we remove k nodes (and all their edges) from the network, how would liquidity change in the
worst-case, and what network topologies are most robust against such failures? If node failures cascade through the network,
how quickly would the network lose liquidity? Another question worth investigating is the effect of transaction routing costs on
liquidity. It appears that a mathematical analysis of a transaction routing model where intermediate nodes charged a routing fee
would require an entirely new approach since it would invalidate the cycle-reachability relation that forms the basis of our results.
5.2 Further Understanding the Model
This model presents a number of interesting directions for further inquiry. The first is the question of pricing of currencies. Let
ruv be the exchange ratio for converting u’s currency into v’s (i.e., 1 unit of u’s currency is ruv units of v’s currency). The
following two properties of these conversion ratios are necessary for the generalized credit network model to be well-defined:
• Conservation: For any S ⊆ V , where S = {u1, u2, . . . , uk},
∏
ru1u2ru2u3 . . . , ruk−1ukruku1 = 1. In words, this
property means that currency is conserved along any cycle of payments in the network.
• Common Knowledge: The conversion ratios are common knowledge for all nodes in V . This means that nodes along a
path through which payment is being routed can compute the outflow given the inflow.
However, these properties do not guarantee that it is incentive-compatible for nodes to route payments. For example, it is natural
to believe that the currency of a node that lies on the path between a number of (source, destination) pairs should be more
expensive compared to one that has, say, only one neighbor. More generally, can we endow the nodes in the network with a
model of rationality that will govern how much credit nodes extend each other, how that changes over time, and how nodes
negotiate currency exchange ratios as a function of transaction rates, success probabilities, network topology, etc.?
The second broad question is how to apply this model to various practical applications, some of which we mention in
the introduction. Of particular interest are analytical results as well as empirical or simulation-based studies that evaluate the
effectiveness of this model in settings such as IP routing, peer-to-peer systems, viral marketing, etc. compared to existing models.
Another potential direction is to consider credit networks as enabling a trust-based market where nodes buy and sell goods
using trusted currency instead of a common currency. Then we can ask the same questions that have been asked of various
traditional market models: Does the market clear? At what prices? Can we efficiently find them? How do equilibrium prices in
this model compare with those in models that assume a common currency? Answers to these questions will provide insights into
12
whether and when can we trade off the robustness properties and the decentralized nature of this model with the well-understood
characteristics of traditional markets.
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A Success Probability in Cycles
Proof of Theorem 10. SinceM has a uniform steady-state distribution over the cycle-reachable equivalence classes, the steady-
state success probability between a pair of nodes separated by l edges in G◦m;c is simply the fraction equivalence classes which
allow a transaction between that pair of nodes.
Note that each equivalence class can be characterized by a state in which at least one edge in G◦c,m has zero capacity in the
counterclockwise direction (any state where all edges are bidirectional is cycle-reachable from one where at least one edge is
unidirectional). Assume that the nodes are numbered 1, . . . ,m and the edge between nodes j and j + 1 is numbered j. Let the
jth edge be the first edge that has zero capacity in the counterclockwise direction. Then the first j − 1 edges can each be in one
of c states, and the remaining m− j edges can each be in one of c+ 1 states. Thus, the total number of states where one or more
edges have zero capacity in the counterclockwise direction is given by:
m∑
j=1
cj−1(c+ 1)m−j = (c+ 1)m−1
m∑
j=1
(
c
c+ 1
)j−1
= (c+ 1)m−1
1− rm
1− r
where r = c/(c+ 1). Now fix nodes s and t that are a distance l apart in the clockwise direction from s to t. Lets call the path of
length l between s and t, P1, and that of length m− l, P2. A successful transaction between s and t along P1 requires edges
in P1 to have capacity in the counterclockwise direction, whereas that along P2 requires edges in P2 to have capacity in the
clockwise direction. If the jth edge lies in P1 then there is no path of length l between s and t. On the other hand, a path of
length m− l between s and t requires each of the m− l edges to be in one of c states. Thus, the number of equivalence classes
that only have a path of length m− l between s and t is
l∑
j=1
cj−1(c+ 1)l−jcm−l = (c+ 1)l−1cm−l
l∑
j=1
(
c
c+ 1
)j−1
= cm−l(c+ 1)l−1
1− rl
1− r
where r = c/(c+1). However, if the jth edge is inP2, it implies that all edges inP1 have positive capacity in the counterclockwise
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direction. Thus, the number of equivalence classes that have a path of length l between s and t is
m∑
j=l+1
cj−1(c+ 1)m−j = cl(c+ 1)m−l−1
m−l∑
j=1
(
c
c+ 1
)j−1
= cl(c+ 1)m−l−1
1− rm−l
1− r
Note that the above equation includes equivalence classes that have capacity along both P1 and P2 as well as those that have
capacity along only P1.
Thus, the probability that a transaction between nodes separated by l edges will succeed is given by
cl(c+ 1)m−l−1(1− rm−l) + cm−l(c+ 1)l−1(1− rl)
(c+ 1)m−1(1− rm)
=
rl(1− rm−l) + rm−l(1− rl)
1− rm =
rl + rm−l − 2rm
1− rm
Taking expectation over the length l of the transaction path gives the result.
As a corollary, we can show that the steady-state success probability in cycle graphs under a uniform transaction regime is
Θ(c/n).
Corollary 14. Let G◦n;c be a cycle graph of n > 2 nodes where each edge has a total credit capacity of c. IfM(G◦n;c,Λ) is an
ergodic Markov chain induced by a uniform transaction matrix Λ over nodes in G◦n;c, then the steady-state transaction success
probability, Ps(G◦n;c), is Θ(c/n).
Proof. Ps(G◦n;c) under a symmetric transaction regime is given by
Ps(G◦) = El
rl + rn−l − 2rn
1− rn (where r = c/(c+ 1))
Therefore, under a uniform transaction regime, as n→∞
lim
n→∞Ps(G
◦) ≤ lim
n→∞
n/2∑
l=1
2n
n(n− 1)
rl + rn−l − 2rn
1− rn
≤ lim
n→∞
2
(n− 1)(1− rn)
n/2∑
l=1
(
rl + rn−l
)
= lim
n→∞
2
(n− 1)(1− rn)
(
r(1− rn/2) + rn/2(1− rn/2)
1− r
)
=
2r
(n− 1)(1− r) = Θ(c/n)
B Failure Probability in Complete Graphs
Proof of Theorem 11. We know that there is a bijection between equivalence classes of a graph and labeled forests [Gio07,
KW81], and the number of forests, an,c, in Kn;c converges to [KW81]
an,c ∼ e1/2ccn−1nn−2 (1)
where fn ∼ gn means limn→∞ fn/gn = 1. By Cayley’s formula there are nn−2 trees on n labeled nodes, so an,1 ≥ nn−2. Any
forest has at most n− 1 edges, so with c labeled copies of each edge cn−1nn−2 ≤ an,c ≤ cn−1an,1. Equation (1) implies that
there exists a constant n0 such that for all n ≥ n0, an,1 ≤ 2e1/2nn−2. Combining these equations, for all n ≥ n0,
cn−1nn−2 ≤ an,c ≤ 2e1/2cn−1nn−2
15
Fix two nodes u and v in Kn;c, and consider a cut between u and v such that the partition containing u has k nodes and that
containing v has n− k nodes. Assume that no payment can be made from u’s partition to v’s partition. Then, the number of
equivalence classes containing this cut is at most ak,can−k,c. Summing over all cuts separating u and v in Kn;c, we upper bound
the transaction failure probability between nodes u and v as
1
an,c
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
ak,can−k,c = 2
n0−1∑
k=1
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
ak,can−k,c
an,c
+
n−n0∑
k=n0
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
ak,can−k,c
an,c
Bounding the first term,
n0−1∑
k=1
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
ak,can−k,c
an,c
= O
(
n0−1∑
k=1
nk−1
(k − 1)!
(ck−1ak,1)(cn−k−1(n− k)n−k−2)
cn−1nn−2
)
= O
(
1
nc
n0−1∑
k=1
ak,1
(k − 1)!
(
n− k
n
)n−k−2)
= O
(
1
nc
)
using that ak,1 = O(1) when k ≤ n0. For the second term,
n−n0∑
k=n0
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
ak,can−k,c
an,c
=O
(
n−n0∑
k=n0
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
(ck−1kk−2)(cn−k−1(n− k)n−k−2)
cn−1nn−2
)
=O
(
1
nc
n−n0∑
k=n0
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
kk−2(n− k)n−k−2
nn−3
)
=O
(
1
nc
n−1∑
k=1
n!
n(n− 1)
k(n− k)
k!(n− k)!
kk(n− k)n−k
nn
n3
k2(n− k)2
)
= O
(
1
nc
n−1∑
k=1
n
(n− k)k
n!
nn
kk
k!
(n− k)n−k
(n− k)!
)
(2)
Instead of using the standard Stirling’s approximation, we will use the more precise Stirling Series:
n! =
√
2pin
(n
e
)n(
1 +
1
12n
+
1
288n2
− 139
51840n3
± · · ·
)
Therefore, n! can be written as
n! =
√
2pin
(n
e
)n
cn, where 1 ≤ cn ≤ 2 when n ≥ 1
Substituting this into (2) and simplifying, we get
1
nc
n−1∑
k=1
n
(n− k)k
n!
nn
kk
k!
(n− k)n−k
(n− k)! = O
(
1
nc
n−1∑
k=1
(
n
(n− k)k
)3/2)
Either k or n− k is at least n/2, so
n−1∑
k=1
(
n
(n− k)k
)3/2
≤ 2
(n−1)/2∑
k=1
(
2
k
)3/2
= O(1)
Summarizing,
1
an,c
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
ak,can−k,c = O
(
1
nc
)
Also, since the node bankruptcy probability in Kn;c is Θ(1/nc), the transaction failure probability is Ω(1/nc). This completes
the proof.
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